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About This Document
This document provides a Roadmap for using the InCommon identity federation to enable 
researchers to access NSF cyberinfrastructure (CI) via their campus authentication service. It 
presents benefits and challenges of using InCommon for NSF cyberinfrastructure, and guidance 
in overcoming the challenges.  The Roadmap has three main sections, each aligned for a different 
audience:
A. Benefits, Challenges and Overview is intended for campus and project leadership, scientists 
and engineers using CI. It provides a summary of InCommon, relevant technologies and 
the benefits and challenges their adoption brings. 
B. The Guide to Technical Deployment is intended for information technology professionals, 
from campuses and NSF cyberinfrastructure projects, and is a guide for deployment of 
InCommon software and services. 
C. The Guide to Policy and Business Processes is intended for managers and policy makers, and 
discusses the policy, privacy, financial and other factors of InCommon deployment. Again it 
is both for staff from campuses and NSF cyberinfrastructure projects. 
A final section provides a glossary, references and other resources.
In order to be insulated from inevitable changes in technologies and to be as comprehensible as 
possible, the document avoids capturing technical details when it can, instead providing references 
to existing (particularly online) documentation provided by InCommon, Internet2 and other 
organizations.
i
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Document Scope
There are a wide variety of federated identity technologies and organizations that seek to form trust 
amongst organizations for online collaboration.  This document is specific to InCommon, with its 
focus on higher education and research institutions, institutions that are highly aligned with the 
NSF science and engineering community. 
This document also focuses on the needs of NSF cyberinfrastructure (CI) Projects, which are 
projects providing computer-based resources (e.g., compute cycles, data resources, shared 
instrumentation, web-based applications, virtual organizations) to scientists and engineers, and 
having some need to identify those researchers in order to, for example, perform access control, 
resource authorization, audit usage, or provide personalization. A full discussion of CI is beyond 
the scope of this document, for context the reader is referred to [59]. As subsequently discussed in 
Section A.1, NSF CI projects frequently have requirements above and beyond normal InCommon 
service providers and this document focuses on meeting those requirements.  
In addition, the document is scoped as follows:
•	 InCommon is most accurately a federation based on the SAML protocol, and this document 
has chosen to focus on Shibboleth as a popular open source SAML implementation used in 
InCommon. Alternatives to Shibboleth, InCommon and SAML are discussed in Section A.5. 
•	 As discussed in the Guide to Policy and Business Processes, InCommon allows for higher levels 
of assurance beyond the base level required for membership – i.e. Bronze and Silver. For the 
purposes of brevity, this document constrains itself to a brief discussion of when these higher 
assurance levels may be appropriate for a CI project to consider.
•	 This document covers cyberinfrastructure projects serving NSF researchers and institutions 
of higher education and research that host those researchers. Effort was made to discuss 
experiences with a variety of institutions of different sizes as to avoid assumptions regarding 
available resources and expertise.
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Benefits, Challenges, and Overview is intended for campus and project leadership, 
and scientists and engineers using cyberinfrastructure. It provides a summary 
of InCommon, relevant technologies and the benefit their adoption brings to 
campuses supporting researchers, the researchers themselves, and cyberinfrastructure 
deployments.
Benefits, Challenges, and Overview
A. Why Use InCommon and Federated Identity
“Today’s scientists and engineers need access to new information technology 
capabilities, such as distributed wired and wireless observing network complexes, 
and sophisticated simulation tools that permit exploration of phenomena that 
can never be observed or replicated by experiment. Computation offers new 
models of behavior and modes of scientific discovery that greatly extend the 
limited range of models that can be produced with mathematics alone, for 
example, chaotic behavior. Fewer and fewer researchers working at the frontiers 
of knowledge can carry out their work without cyberinfrastructure of one form or 
another.”
As this quote from the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) “Cyberinfrastructure Vision for 21st 
Century Discovery” [59] describes, cyberinfrastructure (CI) is a key and necessary component 
to support increasingly collaborative science and engineering. As opposed to traditional high-
performance computing, a key goal of CI is to support scientific collaboration through a variety 
of computational, network, data and software elements distributed across campuses, regional, 
national and international organizations, and spanning scientific communities.
Critical to supporting the CI ecology is a well-coordinated, usable identity management system on 
which CI services can be built to allow for trusted collaboration and sharing of compute and data 
resources across researchers’ institutions. To this end, the joint EDUCAUSE-CASC workshop on CI 
[13] recommended:
“Agencies, campuses, and national and state organizations should adopt a single, 
open, standards-based system for identity management, authentication, and 
authorization, thus improving the usability and interoperability of CI resources 
throughout the nation.”
The same workshop report continues and specifically recommends the InCommon federation as 
the current best solution for broad adoption. 
The InCommon federation represents an implementation of federated identity. Federated identity 
refers to the practice of one organization receiving and utilizing identity information regarding 
a user from another organization, typically the organization at which the user is employed or 
is otherwise a member. The objective is that the latter organization leverages the work the first 
organization has done in enrolling the user, managing a credential (e.g., password1) for the user, 
and asserting attributes about the user.
1 We note that campuses are free to use any authentication credential they desire with InCommon, 
however passwords are common and this document tends to use that term, as it is familiar for many readers.
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Federated identities in general, and InCommon in particular, are becoming standards in 
establishing trust in the research sector.  InCommon has other federal partners, including the 
Department of Energy’s Energy Sciences Network (ESNet) and the National Institutes of Health.
The goal of this Roadmap is to encourage more effective scientific collaboration and team science 
supported by campus and NSF CI by fostering the use of InCommon in order to:
1. Allow researchers to more easily collaborate and coordinate multiple resources through a 
single identity system rather than spending effort on managing multiple identities.
2. Allow NSF CI projects to leverage InCommon saving effort spent on establishing their own 
identity systems.
3. Allow campuses and other institutions to provide their researchers with a consistent 
identity system for local research and administrative computing, and remote research 
computing.
The Roadmap strives to achieve this goal by providing campuses and CI projects with the rationale 
and guidance for deploying and using federated identity, joining InCommon, and supporting 
collaborative science using that infrastructure. 
A.1. What is unique about NSF CI?
A reasonable question is why NSF CI needs a roadmap in addition to the guides for adoption 
of federated identity and InCommon that already exist? NSF CI represents a number of science-
enabling collaborations and resources, including rare (even unique) and valuable computational, 
data and instruments. CI representing these resources often has one or more of the following 
attributes, which make them atypical of InCommon service providers:
•	 Strong requirements for secured sharing: Computational resources are commonly among 
the worlds most powerful and it is not unheard of for them to fall under U.S. Export Control 
law.  NSF CI also manages scientific data created and owned by researchers, data which can 
have privacy, integrity and trusted sharing requirements based on its implications to research 
results that can effect scientific standing and policy issues (e.g., climate change, human subjects 
information).
•	 Distributed researcher communities: A NSF CI project typically has distributed, dynamic 
researcher communities that don’t conform to any group of researchers at any one campus or 
other institution. For example, access to TeraGrid is granted via a national allocations process 
that occurs multiple times per year [66]. Many projects have less formal processes involving 
collaboration participants who may come and go depending on current research interests and 
their alignment with the project. 
•	 A history of identity management: Because of the nature of their resources and communities, 
NSF CI projects often have stringent, self-managed access control requirements. To meet these 
requirements, there is a history in NSF CI projects of performing strong vetting of their users 
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and persistent account management. This creates a situation of researchers having multiple 
digital personas (one for their institution plus additional personas for each project they are 
involved in), thus creating a barrier to trusted virtual collaboration. 
•	 A need for incident response: NSF CI projects often have a need to perform incident response 
to understand the implications of any data breech; a need that is otherwise underrepresented 
in typical federated identity applications.
•	 Non-web access modalities: NSF CI projects often have command-line access modalities that 
are not currently supported by typical federated identity software (though as we discuss in 
Section D.2, such support is planned). For example, a common means of accessing NSF CI is 
through secure shell (SSH) to obtain command-line access and do job submission. 
A.2. Brief Overview of Federated Identity and InCommon
We briefly present some basic terminology 
regarding federated identity and InCommon 
as shown in Figure 1. For more complete and 
technical definitions of the terms, the reader is 
referred to the Glossary.
The term “federated identity” refers to the 
ability to utilize a user’s identity, as managed 
by one organization, across multiple 
organizations. A collection of organizations 
that agree to a common set of practices and 
policies for federated identity are referred to as 
a federation, with the member organizations 
being referred to as participants.
An example of a federation is InCommon, 
which focuses on institutions of higher 
education and organizations providing 
services to those institutions. InCommon is 
governed by its members [25] and operated by 
Internet2.
Within a federation, participants are identity 
providers that instantiate institutionally 
managed services that authenticate users and 
allow their identities to be shared with service 
providers, who consume those identities 
in order to provide access to resources or 
Figure 1. The InCommon landscape showing 
Identity Providers (campuses and institutions), 
the InCommon Federation, and Service Providers 
such as digital libraries, campus services, 
collaboration, and cyberinfrastructure. Enabling 
technologies include the SAML standard and the 
Shibboleth software.
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services.  For example, the Indiana University identity management system represents an identity 
provider, providing institutional credentials and guaranteeing that researchers with Indiana 
University logins have been physically vetted.  A service provider, such as the Indiana Clinical 
and Translational Sciences Institute HUB [43], accepts institutional credentials from a number 
of identity providers and allows users of those identity providers access to cyberinfrastructure 
services such as data management and shared computational facilities.
The term “identity” is used to refer the aggregate of identifiers, which uniquely identifies an 
individual, with a collection of zero or more attributes regarding that person. Identifiers can 
be ephemeral, used only for a single session, pseudonomymous, persistent for arbitrarily long 
periods of time but not reflecting the user’s physical identity, or fully identifying, persistent and 
reflective of the user’s physical identity  (e.g., an email address). Attributes provide information 
about a person such as their institutional role (e.g., faculty), department, class enrollment, or 
contact information (e.g., phone number). Privacy is preserved by the controlled release of 
identity information to service providers, a process referred to as attribute release.
InCommon is based on the SAML standard [67], which defines message formats and protocols to 
provide for interoperability among participants. Building on SAML, eduPerson [15] defines a set 
of user attributes common to educational institutions that is heavily used in InCommon.
A key function of the federation is to manage and distribute metadata among its participants. 
Metadata, whose format is defined by the SAML standard, is information that describes federation 
participants (identity and service providers) and allows participants to securely communicate 
identity information.  
To utilize InCommon, software is needed that implements the SAML standards and provides 
identity providers with the tools to provide identities, service providers with the tools to consume 
identities, and users of the system the tools to express their intents with regards to authentication 
and privacy. A number of commercial and open-source SAML implementations are available. 
Shibboleth [78] is frequently used in InCommon. It is freely available as an open source project 
spearheaded by Internet2, and the focus of choice for this Roadmap.
A.3. Benefits for Researcher, Institution and CI Project
In this section, we describe the benefits for using federated identity and InCommon to support 
NSF science and engineering from three perspectives: that of the NSF researcher, that of the CI 
project, and that of the researcher’s institution. 
A.3.1. Benefits to the Researcher
To help understand the benefits of federated identities in research, we introduce you to Jean Blue, 
Professor and Researcher, and present a morning in her life supported by federated identity.
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Dr. Blue gets up in the morning and logs into her campus to check her email. One 
of the notes is from her campus sponsored research office, indicating that a report 
is due on her NSF grant. She goes to the sponsored research office web site, and 
selects the research.gov link there. Because she previously logged in to her campus 
to check email, and because research.gov trusts her campus to provide accurate, up 
to date identity information, Dr. Blue’s prior authentication is automatically used 
to allow access to her research.gov account and Dr. Blue uploads the requested 
report.
Another one of her emails alerts her to new data posted on the translational 
research wiki at National Institutes Health (https://www.ctsawiki.org/wiki/).  
She navigates to wiki, which like research.gov uses her prior institutional login 
to authenticate and welcome her directly to her personal wiki page. Seeing new 
data sets available, she decides to launch a job on the TeraGrid to analyze them. 
She opens a browser window to CILogon (https://cilogon.org/), which notes her 
campus authentication but asks her to release some additional attributes, such as a 
screen name, as requested by the CI service providers.
Jean then checks on the latest data for a clinical trial she is managing. The data is 
stored on Jean’s local campus and accessible via secured web site, which permits 
her access based on her previous login.  The site presents her with a request for 
access from a colleague at another institution to collaborate on a paper they are co-
authoring. To make the request, the colleague authenticated to that data store with 
their campus login and approved the release of attributes - campus department and 
role in this case - to help validate the request. Jean reviews the request, recognizing 
the collaborator based on their name and attributes, and approves the request, 
granting access without having to create another username and password for the 
colleague.
Finally, Jean jumps over to Elsevier (http://www.sciencedirect.com/) to check some 
recent journals. The site welcomes her back, granting her access based on her status 
as her campus without knowing her actual identity, and alerts her that three of her 
watch-list words had been triggered by articles in her chosen journals. Jean sighs, 
and flags them for later reading.
It has been a busy morning, with a lot of collaboration done, all with a single 
campus identity.
How much of Jean Blue’s story is real today? Every site with a URL is operational today using 
federated identities; the other scenarios are under active development.
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As illustrated by this example, the direct benefit to the researcher is that they can utilize many 
CI resources without having to create yet another username and password for each. Initially this 
expedites obtaining access to CI by removing delays with secure distribution of passwords to these 
resources.  Over the lifetime of the researcher’s access, it removes the need for the researcher to 
manage a separate username and password, reducing the chance of forgetting the password and 
giving them an existing campus support system for changing the password, resetting it in the 
event they forget it, etc.  This not only means that there is a higher level of security, but also less 
overall effort since each of these services does not have to repeat a vetting process to ensure that 
the researcher is who they claim, instead leveraging the effort performed by their institutional 
identity provider.  This is especially important for access to secured resources such as the TeraGrid or 
sensitive data, such as human subjects data.
In the bigger picture, the utilization of their campus login for access is a key first step to allowing 
someone to utilize any CI without concern about where it might be located or who is operating 
it.  This allows researchers to focus on science and scientific collaboration without having to worry 
about what collaborators have accounts where, setting up authentication services, and the like.
For researchers with security concerns about data and other resources they are sharing in their 
collaboration, the use of campus credentials provides greater assurance, as collaborators will be 
less inclined to share or otherwise mishandle those credentials as they might a password generated 
solely for the collaboration.   The credentials are also tied to the collaborator’s position at an 
institution, meaning that in the event a researcher loses academic status, and the identity will be 
revoked and cannot be used for access.  This allows service providers to more easily provide trusted 
access to sensitive data, and administrative processes for study review, like Institutional Review 
Boards (IRBs) can be undertaken with greater confidence and streamlined.
Finally, funding agencies, such as NIH (see [49]) and NSF, have joined InCommon and are moving 
towards federated identity as the access mechanism for grant application and administration. 
Utilization of federated identity for CI will bring uniformity to the authentication mechanism for 
science in line with the business processes of doing science.
A.3.2. Benefits for the CI project
“Harvesting the science content from LIGO [Laser Interferometer Gravitational-
Wave Observatory] data is a collaborative effort between instrumentalists, data 
analysts, modelers, and theorists. Efficient collaboration begins with scalable 
and robust identity management infrastructure that can easily be leveraged and 
integrated with the wide spectrum of tools LIGO scientists use to collaborate and 
analyze the LIGO data. Middleware from Internet2, including Shibboleth and 
Grouper, is enabling more LIGO science through easier collaboration and access 
to resources.” -- Scott Koranda, Senior Scientist at the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee and lead architect of the LIGO [54] Identity Management effort
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A NSF CI project receives many of the same benefits from InCommon as any other InCommon 
Service Provider. Descriptions of these benefits, including multi-media presentations, can be found 
at the InCommon for Service Providers web site [32]. We summarize the benefits here and highlight 
those most applicable to CI projects.
The immediate benefit of federated identity to a project with any sort of access control requirements 
is that they still control who has access to their resources, but authentication is performed by their 
researchers’ home institutions, getting the project out of the business of creating password databases 
and distributing passwords (and re-distributing them when they are lost). Initially, this has the 
benefit of expediting the granting of access to new users since they already possess their passwords. 
A case study from the Swedish Alliance for Middleware Infrastructure on federated identity 
addressing costs of the identity vetting process can be found in [55].
In the longer term, federated identity also reduces overhead on the project for managing researchers’ 
passwords – e.g., resetting forgotten passwords, regular expiration – allowing the researcher instead 
to use already familiar campus processes. This reduction in responsibility can be of particular 
benefit to smaller, resource-constrained projects and collaborations.
From a security perspective, the use of the campus password for authentication also decreases 
the chance the researcher shares or otherwise mishandles that password, resulting in increased 
assurance of the user’s identity. Removing the need to distribute passwords reduces risk of password 
exposure. And expediting researcher access by removing the need for password distribution acts to 
decrease the motivation for users to share passwords.
Furthermore, access can be based on researcher’s attributes; for example, their role as faculty at 
their campus, either solely or in addition to the user’s identifier. This use allows for automatic 
provisioning and de-provisioning of researcher access without time consuming verification of these 
attributes by project staff. For example, a service could verify on every use that a researcher remains 
their position as asserted by their home institution.
From the perspective of adoption, providing researchers access with an existing credential, and one 
potentially in use by other CI projects, removes one step in setting up the project CI, reducing a 
barrier to entry and encouraging use.
A.3.3. Benefits for the researcher’s institution
As in the previous section on benefits to CI projects, campuses receive a number of benefits from 
the adoption of InCommon and federated identity that are documented by InCommon [28]. We 
summarize those benefits here and highlight those most applicable to supporting NSF science and 
engineering CI projects:
•	 Controlled, scalable access to external services. Shibboleth and InCommon provide a scalable 
means of providing controlled access to external services. For example, they can replace current 
schemes based on IP addresses for controlled access to digital libraries with a scheme based on 
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the institution’s provisioned user base [37]. A complete list of InCommon Sponsored Partners 
either providing or in the process of providing access via InCommon can be found on the 
InCommon participants web page [11].
•	 Privacy controls. Shibboleth gives the campus and its faculty, staff and students privacy controls 
with regards to what attributes are released to each service provider. It supports anonymous 
and pseudonymous authentication, and the ability to receive user consent for the release of 
attributes, which can be beneficial in addressing legal requirements such as FERPA or HIPAA.
•	 Visibility into CI usage. The use of federated identity gives the campus visibility into the 
use of CI (and other services) by its user community since the campus is now part of the 
authentication process. This allows for the collection of aggregated, privacy-respecting statistics 
on what services are used by what types of users, and with what frequency.
•	 Grant competitiveness. Supporting federated identity will increasingly be important to grant 
competitiveness as the grant process moves to InCommon, as science increasingly moves to 
team science, and as effective collaborations improve science outcomes.  InCommon will 
permit institutional researchers improved, or even preapproved, access to offsite data and 
analytical resources, allowing them to be more competitive in terms of research.
•	 Uniform authentication mechanism. Providing an authentication mechanism usable by 
both researchers on campus and their external collaborators helps prevent “home-grown” 
authentication systems being set up by researchers in front of potentially sensitive data (e.g., a 
collaboration sharing clinical data). In general, providing the same authentication mechanism 
for internal CI that is used by external CI allows the campus to provide CI locally for researchers 
and their collaborators that removes a barrier to transitioning between that local CI and 
regional or national CI.
•	 Internal single sign-on. Federated identity provides web single sign-on internal to the campus 
with the usual benefits of doing so, namely a single password for users, centralized provisioning 
of accounts, and central auditing. 
•	 InCommon certificate service. A side benefit to joining InCommon is access to the InCommon 
Certificate Service [29], providing X.509 certificates (SSL, EV, personal signing, encryption, and 
code signing) for a fixed annual fee.
A.4. Challenges of Federated Identity
In order to be balanced in our presentation, we discuss here the challenges to deploying and using 
federated identity and InCommon. In the following section, we discuss some of the alternatives to 
InCommon and their trade-offs. The authors of this Roadmap believe these challenges are out-
weighed by the advantages and the approach of this roadmap is at least as good a choice as the 
alternatives, but we acknowledge that every solution has disadvantages as well as advantages and so 
include this section in the interest of full disclosure.
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A.4.1. Mature Identity Management as a Required Prerequisite
In our discussions with organizations that have deployed Shibboleth and joined InCommon, a 
consistent prerequisite that came up was the organization having a “mature” identity management 
system in place before it undertakes federated identity. What constitutes “mature” is somewhat 
subjective, however the following have emerged as key features:
•	 A centralized user directory infrastructure. The organization has a single known, authoritative 
source for user information (authentication and attributes) with defined interfaces for accessing 
that information and controls on its modification.
•	 Understood business processes for user enrollment. The organization understands how users 
are enrolled in their identity management system, how their roles are assigned, and how they 
are removed from the system. This includes an understanding, at least, of what the edge cases 
are; for example: guest logins, anonymous library users, contractors, incoming students, and 
incoming faculty.
•	 Automated user provisioning. Based on the business processes, user provisioning and de-
provisioning in the identity management system (i.e. addition, removal and attribute 
management of users), should be, at least for a majority of users, automated.
To be clear, an organization doesn’t need to have these completely solved (no organization 
probably does), but more complete solutions lead to easier federated identity deployment and 
higher levels of trust.
Establishing an identity management system is outside the scope of this document, however some 
resources for doing so can be found in Section D.2.
A.4.2. Changes to Risk Profile
Federated identity turns what used to be an identity management process that was internal to an 
organization into a process distributed across multiple organizations. This brings changes to the risk 
profile of an adopting organization:
•	 Reliance on the external infrastructure. For a CI project, the trade-off for reduced workload 
and interoperability is a reliance on the InCommon federation and federation partners (and 
interconnecting infrastructure), which entails risks to both reliability and security. Related 
to this is that in the bigger picture, by increasing the scope of use for a single authentication, 
we increase the impact if that authentication is fraudulent (put simply, if the researcher’s 
campus password is stolen, it grants illicit access to more services with federated identity). 
Quantification of these risks is difficult because they depend on the specific set of services 
used by each individual researcher and a lack of long-term operational data, but is something 
participants need to be aware of and accept (or identify mitigation strategies for).
•	 Reliance on enabling technologies. The use of federated identity involves relying on enabling 
technologies, for example Shibboleth software. Mitigating this risk is InCommon’s use of open 
standards and Shibboleth’s track record as an Internet2 member-supported software project.
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•	 Risk of user attribute exposure. Shibboleth provides attribute release policies to control, on a 
service provider by service provider basis, the sharing of user attributes. Nevertheless, there is 
still a risk of human or software error resulting in inappropriate sharing. Emerging technologies 
such as uApprove [93] allows users to participate in attribute release and mitigates this risk.
A.4.3. Expenses of InCommon Membership and Shibboleth 
Deployment
For organizations that chose to deploy Shibboleth and manage the process of joining InCommon 
themselves, which is a very typical thing to do, the largest cost will be staff time. In the subsequent 
section (A.4.4) we summarize the effort required for organizations to estimate this cost.
In addition to staff time other expenses include:
•	 InCommon Participant Fees: Currently $1000-$3000 annually depending on the size of the 
organization plus a $700 one-time fee. Please see the InCommon web site [31] for details and 
changes since the writing of this document.
•	 Web certificates for identity and service providers. As with any other secure web server, these 
services need web server certificates. (Note that organizations could use the InCommon Cert 
Service as described in Section A.3.3 for these certificates.)
Alternatively, organizations can choose, as discussed in Section A.5, to outsource portions of the 
Shibboleth deployment - from design consultation to service hosting. This obviously shifts internal 
effort re-allocation to out-of-pocket expenses, and while organizations may choose this route, it 
does not appear to be a requirement for most organizations capable of running their own identity 
management systems.  Outsourcing identity management services can also create additional risks, 
such as an outside entity having possession of institutional credential information.
A.4.4. Effort Required for InCommon Membership and Shibboleth 
Deployment
Most organizations choose to deploy Shibboleth (or an alternative) and manage joining 
InCommon themselves. As discussed in the previous section on expenses, staff time is the largest 
expense of this approach. It is difficult to give a quantified effort level for participating in federated 
identity as processes, expertise, culture and other factors vary between organizations and projects. 
We instead break down in Table 1 the effort required for deploying and maintaining federated 
identity and InCommon membership into a set of equivalencies to other common activities in 
terms of required effort and skills. The expectation is that the reader can judge the effort that 
these equivalent activities would require for their organization or project, and translate that into a 
quantified estimate for participation in InCommon. 
Note that we provide only a summary of the tasks in this section, focusing on the effort level rather 
than “how to” details; for details on accomplishing the tasks, please see the subsequent Roadmap 
sections on Technical Issues, and Policy and Business Process Issues.
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InCommon Membership Activity Roughly Equivalent Activity/Effort
Leadership for process of joining Requires CIO or delegate with support of campus 
leadership.
Policy and business process documentation 
and modification
Major authentication policy change, e.g., 
establishing a new minimum password strength.
Signing InCommon membership agreement Contract signing.
Deployment of Shibboleth Identity Provider 
software
Deployment of a web single sign-on system (e.g., 
CAS [5]).
Deployment of Shibboleth Service Provider 
software
Deployment of a web application protected by 
web single sign-on; varies greatly by application.
Addition of a federated partner Technically is a minor configuration change. From 
a policy perspective varies based on partner’s 
requirements; having well defined process in place 
eases this.
Software/service maintenance Maintaining a web single sign-on service. A few 
additional activities are minor overhead.
Table 1: Activities involved in joining and maintain membership in InCommon and rough estimates 
of the effort required based on equivalent activities.
A.5. Alternatives to InCommon and Shibboleth
We briefly describe some alternatives to the InCommon and Shibboleth approach highlighted in 
this Roadmap, and discuss their trade-offs.
•	 Bilateral agreements without InCommon. It is possible, at least in theory, to forgo a federation 
and use a set of bilateral agreements to support a federated identity fabric. Given the relatively 
low cost of supporting InCommon, the time costs of establishing similar bilateral agreement 
would seem to quickly outpace any savings.
•	 Using social networking identities. Instead of InCommon, an organization or project could 
utilize identities as asserted by social networking sites (e.g., Facebook, Google, Yahoo) using 
technologies such as OAuth [68] and OpenID [96]. The advantages and disadvantages of 
this approach is an area of some debate currently. On the side of social networking is that 
social networking sites absorb the costs of providing identities and users tend to already have 
such accounts. On the other hand, social networking identities tend to be self-asserted by the 
users (e.g., see [17]).  There is no institutional authority behind them, thus InCommon has 
the potential for higher strength of authentication. InCommon has the advantage of greater 
stability provided by higher education institutions, as opposed to commercial entities, which 
may change their practices due to business concerns. InCommon also has the ability to include 
attributes from the user’s home institution. It is also not an either-or situation, use cases are 
emerging [50] where these technologies are complementary: Shibboleth is used to provide 
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stronger authentication for employees and students, and OpenID is used for guest accounts to 
access less-sensitive resources.
•	 Projects can establish their own identity management system. CI projects can establish their own 
identity management systems, even utilizing single sign-on solutions to achieve some benefits 
of federated identity (such as the Earth Systems Grid [88] has done). This approach brings the 
benefit of being more of a known approach and keeps the project in control of their destiny, at 
the cost operating their own authentication infrastructure and a lack of interoperability.
•	 Alternative SAML implementations. There exist a number of open source and proprietary 
implementation alternatives to Shibboleth. We do not try to capture a list of such 
implementations here due to the fact it would be quickly out of date, but the list of InCommon 
affiliates [26] would be a good starting point for researching these alternatives. Organizations 
may want to explore these options, as it is certainly possible that while Shibboleth serves many 
organizations well, an alternative may serve a particular organization better. For example, an 
organization heavily using Microsoft products should explore federated identity products 
offered by Microsoft.
•	 Utilize a third-party identity provider. There exist commercial parties that can provide federated 
identity provider services that interoperate with InCommon for an organization that does not 
want to deploy their own service. Based on discussions, we believe a decision to pursue such an 
option is based more on an organization’s culture than any technical or effort consideration. 
The list of InCommon affiliates [26] and sponsored partners [11] are good places to start 
exploring options.
A.6. Section Conclusion
This concludes the first section of the Roadmap for using NSF Cyberinfrastructure with InCommon. 
We hope that it has provided a good overview of InCommon, federated identity, and the 
advantages, disadvantages and challenges of deploying a federated identity system to support 
collaborative research and enable better science outcomes. This document has two subsequent 
sections: one on Technical matters and one on Policy and Business Processes that go into more 
depth on addressing the challenges involved in joining InCommon and using it to support NSF 
cyberinfrastructure.
Two versions of this Roadmap are distributed: A complete version and, mainly intended for print, 
an abbreviated version. The abbreviated version does not include the two subsequent sections. They 
be may found online at:
http://www.incommon.org/nsfroadmap.html
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The Guide to Technical Deployment is intended for information technology 
professionals, from campuses and NSF cyberinfrastructure projects, and is a guide 
for deployment of InCommon software and services.
Guide to Technical Deployment
B. Guide to Technical Deployment
Part of implementing federated identity is the deployment and operation of technical services that 
handle the transmission of identity information from the researcher’s institution to the project 
or resource that utilizes that information. The goal of this section is to provide direction for the 
deployment and operation of these services for both the researcher’s institution and the CI project, 
along with their integration with the existing services at those organizations to enable their use.
This section is split into guidance for the researcher’s institution (the identity provider) and for 
the CI project (the service provider).  Since Shibboleth deployment and joining InCommon are 
well documented by the Shibboleth project and InCommon respectively, this roadmap covers the 
generic aspects of doing so briefly and focuses on aspects to support NSF CI. 
Details specific to supporting NSF CI are highlighted, as this paragraph is, to allow users familiar 
with Shibboleth and InCommon to quickly skim and locate these steps.
Note that a typical deployment process, for both an identity provider and a service provider, is to go 
through the deployment process once to deploy a prototype service to be tested by a small number 
of friendly users and staff, digest the lessons learned from that experience, and then plan out a 
production deployment. We recommend that approach, as difficulties with Shibboleth deployments 
tend to lie in its interactions with other services.  This approach will expose those problems as early 
as possible in the deployment process.
B.1. Introduction to Technical Issues
We briefly introduce the technical issues in this section that span both identity and service 
providers.
B.1.1. Attribute Release and Persistent User Identifiers
A strength of Shibboleth is its ability to release attributes in a controlled manner from identity 
providers to service providers. When a participant joins InCommon as a service provider, they 
undergo what is often referred to the “boarding process” [46]. This process entails that service 
providers determine their attribute needs, request those attributes of the identity providers 
representing their users, and then the identity provider administrator configures what attributes will 
be released to the service provider. For background on attribute release, see [52]. This process has 
both policy and technical aspects; in practice, the effort required for the policy aspects, which we 
discuss in Section C on Policy and Business Practices, eclipse the effort required for the technical 
aspects discussed in this section.
In practice, the attribute of interest to NSF CI that is most unusual, though not unique, is a 
persistent user identifier so that identity-based access control and auditing can be implemented.
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Within InCommon, with its use of the eduPerson attributes, there are two typical ways of 
accomplishing the release of a persistent identity:
•	 Use of the eduPerson Principal Name (ePPN). In this scenario an internal identifier for a user is 
used to generate an identifying attribute that looks very much like an email address (and could 
actually be an email address). Directions for configuring ePPN in the context of Shibboleth can 
be found at [77].
•	 Use of the eduPerson Targeted Identifier (ePTID). In this scenario a unique identifier is 
generated for the user for each relying party they visit. Directions for configuring ePTID in the 
context of Shibboleth can be found at [77]. 
A possible problem with the ePPN approach is if the institution re-assigns their internal user 
identifiers over time (e.g., after a user departs the institution, their identifier is recycled). In this 
case an ePPN today may not refer to the same user at some time in the future. A more complete 
discussion of this issue can be found in [4].
The ePTID approach does not suffer from this problem, as an identifier is defined never be reused 
and hence it will always refer to the same user. The downside of the ePTID approach is that to 
ensure uniqueness, ePTID must be either computed or retrieved from some persistent storage at 
the time of use. Both of these approaches created additional infrastructure complexity. Hence many 
organizations instead choose to adopt policies changes to make ePPNs such that they are not re-
assigned (e.g., they do not reassign identifiers even after users depart).
B.1.2. Metadata
InCommon maintains information about its participants and their service deployments that 
all participants require in order to interact with each other. This information is referred to as 
“metadata” [56]. All participants will need to initially install InCommon’s metadata and then, 
typically, run an automated process to maintain a local copy of the most recent metadata to reflect 
changes in InCommon membership and service information.
B.1.3. Joining InCommon 
The steps to joining InCommon are documented on the InCommon website [53]. From a technical 
perspective, the main steps are:
•	 Selecting an Administrator and having that person vetted via phone by InCommon. The 
Administrator should be authoritative for the technical data submitted to InCommon by the 
organization and is typically a member of the senior technical staff.
•	 Completing the Participant Operating Agreement [39]. This document needs to be completed 
by a person or persons familiar with both the technical and policy aspects of the organization’s 
identity management system and authorized to sign on behalf of the institution.
•	 Registering the deployment using the InCommon administrative interface [2] so that site 
information is entered into the InCommon metadata.
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•	 Deploying Shibboleth services, integrating them with the local identity management system 
or application service(s) in the process. Downloading the InCommon Metadata [38,56] and 
configuring Shibboleth-enabled services to utilize it [41].
B.1.4. User Support
Like any other service provided by an institution, a user support plan should be in place to help 
users who encounter difficulties. One aspect of federated identity is that issues can easily span 
multiple organizations. Because of this, institutions will want to at least be aware of the support 
points of contact at other key organizations and ideally establish working relationships with them 
to help debug user issues when they arise.
A challenge particular to NSF CI and federated identity is that it is not unusual for support staff not 
to have access to the NSF CI due to NSF CI tending to use identity-based access control. Ideally CI 
projects should allow for access by identity provider support staff to allow that staff to be familiar 
with the access modality and to aid in debugging.
B.1.5. Computer Security Incident Response
Federated identity presents a new challenge to computer security incident response in that it extends 
the impact of user credentials being used illicitly by third parties from being a purely localized 
incident at identity providers to incidents that effect service providers relying on those identity 
providers. We highly recommend that both identity and service providers incorporate this into their 
risk assessment processes. We also recommend that organizations ensure that their team responsible 
for computer security incident response be aware of the possibility of illicitly-used credentials being 
used through the federated identity system, and incorporate a check for such activity into their 
incident response process, contacting affected organizations in the event such activity is determined 
to have taken place.
NSF CI projects are frequently, due to their use of sensitive resources and/or data, more interested in 
computer security incident response than are typical service providers.
B.2. Technical Deployment for Institutions (Identity Providers)
In this section we provide guidance for the technical aspects of Shibboleth deployment, InCommon 
membership and supporting NSF CI for institutions representing users which are acting as Identity 
Providers (IdPs). The majority of these steps are generic to any InCommon identity provider; hence 
this document summarizes and provides references for the relevant Shibboleth and InCommon 
documentation, and instead focuses on aspects particularly important to supporting NSF CI. 
This section focuses on an institution that is deploying its own Shibboleth services. Alternatives, 
such as an outsourced deployment, are discussed in Section A.5.
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B.2.1. Prerequisite Identity Management System
As discussed in Section A.4.1, federated identity builds on an existing identity management system. 
While establishing an identity management system is outside the scope of this document, some 
resources for doing so can be found in Section F.2.
From a technical deployment perspective, a mature identity management system means providing:
•	 A well-defined authentication interface. The Shibboleth IdP software is deployed as protected 
web application and requires an authentication service, such as Kerberos, LDAP, etc., that can be 
integrated into a web hosting container to provide authentication. 
•	 A well-defined attribute interface. The Shibboleth IdP retrieves user attributes for transport to 
service providers as discussed in Section A.2. 
More details on how these services are used by the IdP are provided in the following section on 
deploying the IdP software.
B.2.2. Shibboleth Identity Provider Service Deployment
A complete list of Shibboleth deployment steps can be found in the Shibboleth deployment 
checklist [80] and greater detail on how to perform each of these steps can be found in the 
Shibboleth support documentation [89], in particular the Shibboleth Getting Started Guide [81] 
and the Technical Deployers Info Center [86]. Technical details are accurate with version 2.2 of the 
Shibboleth IdP software, the most recent at the time of this writing.
B.2.2.1. Deploy the Shibboleth Identity Provider Software
Building on the identity management system, the first step is to deploy an appropriate hosting 
container, typically Apache Tomcat, and the Shibboleth identity provider (IdP) software. Full details 
can be found in the Shibboleth IdP install guide [21]. 
As part of this process the deployer will integrate the IdP with the local authentication and attribute 
services [24]. For authentication, the Shibboleth IdP will be similar to any authenticated web 
application in that it will need to be configured to interact with the organization’s authentication 
service. Attributes are made available by configuring (or developing for unsupported interfaces) 
appropriate data connectors [18]. 
Configuring one or more methods of releasing a persistent identifier as described in Section B.1.1 
should be done to support NSF CI.
B.2.2.2. Establishing Auditing
The identity provider administrator should ensure auditing is configured and functional [22] 
to support debugging, security incident response and gathering usage statistics for planning. 
Auditing tends to be more important with NSF CI than with other service providers because of 
what is typically a strong interest in user support and security incident response (as discussed in 
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Section B.1.5). Hence a key goal of auditing would be to identify a user given a report containing 
information available to a service provider.
B.2.2.3. Joining InCommon and Configuration Metadata Maintenance
The next step would be joining InCommon and configuring metadata as discussed in Section B.1.3. 
The process of joining InCommon enters the organization’s information into the InCommon 
metadata. The organization then needs to obtain InCommon’s metadata [56] so that it can interact 
with other InCommon participants.
Subsequent to the initial metadata configuration, InCommon will regularly have membership 
and contact information changes that result in metadata changes. An IdP needs to keep its local 
copy of the metadata up to date to track these changes. This can be accomplished by configuring 
the IdP [38] to use a metadata provider that downloads the metadata automatically (e.g., 
FileBackedHTTPMetadataProvider [23]) or regularly update a local metadata copy with, e.g., cron.
B.2.2.4. Configuring Attribute Release
As discussed in Section B.1.1, a Shibboleth IdP administrator needs to configure attribute release 
policies so that service providers receive the attributes they require. The organization should 
determine a process for determining the attribute release policies (see Section C.3.4) and the 
administrator should implement an initial configuration [19].
At this point an organization would be capable of testing its deployment with other InCommon 
participants.
B.2.2.5. Replicated Deployment
While load does not tend to be a factor requiring replication, many organizations, when deploying 
a Shibboleth IdP in production, choose to replicate the identity provider service for reliability. The 
Shibboleth project provides guidance for such replication [20]. 
B.2.3. Maintenance
There are a number of ongoing technical maintenance tasks associated with an identity provider 
deployment. Please see Section C.2.7 for a discussion. None tend to be particular to supporting NSF 
CI.
B.3. Technical Deployment for Cyberinfrastructure Projects (Service 
Providers)
In this section we turn to technical deployment advice for NSF CI projects acting in the role of 
service providers, that is, consumers of identities provided by campuses and other institutions 
acting as identity providers. This whole section regards NSF CI projects and is not highlighted past 
this paragraph.
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In general, CI projects will face a subset of the following challenges in enabling researcher access by 
InCommon:
1. Integrating the methods their users use to access the project’s CI with the web-based profiles 
supported by InCommon. There are two factors that influence the best solution for how the 
project interfaces with InCommon:
a. Usage modality, that is, whether users utilize a web browser or command line client to 
access the project?
b. Authentication method, that is, do users utilize public key infrastructure (PKI) 
credentials [95], also referred to as “grid certificates”, for authentication or some other 
means?
2. Integration of federated identities with the project identity management system. While 
federated identity allows projects to rely on identity providers to authenticate their users, 
the projects are still responsible for determining what privileges (if any) the user possesses 
within the project, so this portion of the identity management system remains the project’s 
responsibility and must be interconnected with Shibboleth and InCommon by the project.
3. As with any other service provider, undergoing the “boarding process”: establishing their 
attribute needs and arranging attribute release from the identity providers representing their 
users.
4. Making arrangements for access by members of their user community whose institutions 
are not currently participating identity providers in InCommon.
This section starts with a brief discussion of PKI Credentials and CILogon, an online service 
designed to bridge from InCommon to PKI credentials that are commonly used in NSF projects. It 
then proceeds to discuss each of the challenges listed above and concludes with other issues.
B.3.1. Public Key Infrastructure Credentials and CILogon
It is common for NSF CI projects to use public key infrastructure (PKI) credentials (“grid 
certificates”) for authentication [95]. The use of PKI credentials is common for “grid” command-
line clients (e.g., GSI-OpenSSH, GridFTP, GRAM, Condor-G). PKI can be integrated into web 
portals allowing researchers to authenticate with a username and password, and a PKI credential is 
obtained for the researcher, for example, from MyProxy [3]. The credential is then used by the portal 
with a grid client to access PKI-enabled services on the researcher’s behalf. 
The CILogon Service [8] is a NSF-funded service to bridge between InCommon and CI that utilizes 
PKI credentials. CILogon can either deliver a PKI credential to the user’s local system or to a project 
web portal. In typical usage, a CI project portal would redirect a user to the CILogon service, which 
would authenticate the user utilizing InCommon, generate an X.509 credential as a result of that 
authentication and then securely pass that credential to the project portal (details of how this is 
done are available at [7]). This credential serves both to establish the user’s identity for the portal 
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and can be used by the portal to access other services on the user’s behalf (described subsequently 
in Section B.3.2.2.4).
B.3.2. CI Project InCommon Solutions
Table 2 shows the solutions available based on the following two factors discussed in the 
introduction to this section:
•	 The project’s usage modality: does the project support access via a web-based interface or a 
command-line application (or other non-web interface such as a programmatic API)?
•	 The project’s authentication mechanism: does the project support access via PKI, or other 
mechanisms?
Usage Modality Authentication Mechanism
PKI Other
Web-based CILogon with project portal Shibboleth-protected portal
Command-line CILogon with PKI-enabled 
command line clients
No current solution available
Table 2: Solutions depending on project’s normal mode of access and authentication mechanism.
The solutions are not mutually exclusive; projects may want to deploy more than one if they 
support multiple usage methods – for example, web and SSH access. The four solutions are 
summarized in the following list and described in detail in the following subsections:
1. Projects providing a web interface and not using PKI can deploy the standard Shibboleth 
Service Provider (SP) software to Shibboleth-enable their web interface and then join 
InCommon as would be normal for an InCommon service provider. 
2. Projects providing a web interface and using PKI credentials (e.g., projects using MyProxy) 
can utilize the CILogon service to authenticate the users via InCommon and deliver a PKI 
credential to the project portal for the user.
3. Projects providing a command line interface and using PKI credentials can utilize the 
CILogon service, but, unlike the previous scenario, have the CILogon service deliver a PKI 
credential to the user’s local system for use by PKI-enabled applications (e.g., GSI-SSH, 
GridFTP).
4. Projects that are current utilizing a command-line interface and authentication other than 
PKI currently have no good solution available to them. The only guidance this document 
can give is that the project transition to one of the other scenarios or monitor the items 
discussed in the future work section (F.1), namely MoonShot and the Federated SSH work.
Some examples of projects utilizing or exploring these options at the time of this writing, which 
may have experiences to share, are:
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•	 TeraGrid [4] utilizes a variant of solution (3). Its solution was implemented as a processor of 
CILogon. TeraGrid is in process of integrating Shibboleth support into the TeraGrid User Portal 
[92] to support solution (2) in addition.
•	 InCommon access to research.gov is being piloted by NSF [58], representing an 
implementation of solution (1).
•	 The Indiana Clinical and Translational Sciences Institute [43] provides for InCommon-based 
access to its web site as an implementation of solution (1).
•	 The Open Science Grid [70], DataONE [12] and Ocean Observatory Initiative [69] are in 
process of exploring or implementing a CILogon-based approach – (2) and/or (3).
B.3.2.1. Shibboleth-protecting a Web Portal
For projects that utilize a web portal as their user interface, deploying the Shibboleth SP software 
to Shibboleth-enable that web portal is an option. This is done as is typical with any Shibboleth SP 
deployment; hence we summarize the steps here calling out issues particular to NSF CI.
As with an identity provider deployment, it is recommended that this be undertaken with a 
prototype deployment first and then transitioned to a production portal.
Note that a major challenge to this approach is arranging attribute release from all the identity 
providers who represent the project’s users as discussed in Section B.1.1.
B.3.2.1.1. Deploying the Shibboleth SP Software
The first step is to deploy the Shibboleth SP software [82] to Shibboleth-enable the project web 
portal. How challenging this will be depends on what technology is in use to host the portal and 
how suited the application is itself to having authentication performed outside the application.
In terms of hosting platforms, the Shibboleth SP software works well with the Apache HTTPd and 
Microsoft IIS platforms, and documentation also exists to couple it with Java-based containers (e.g., 
Tomcat) [45]. Outside of these technologies you are more likely to find challenges.  The best advice 
is to try and find via, for example, the Shibboleth users email list or a web search engine, someone 
else who has undertaken Shibboleth integration with your particular technology.  Undertaking 
integration with a technology for the first time is likely to be a significant challenge.
The level of effort to modify the application to be Shibboleth-protected will vary depending 
on whether the software was written with modular authentication in mind. Many services have 
a ‘baked in’ identity management solution and modifying the software to support federated 
identity can be significant effort. Much research software, developed as research itself by computer 
scientists or informaticians, may have no concept of security built in at all, which is actually easier 
to integrate, as coarse-grained access control lists can be implemented by the container and the 
application unmodified.  The Internet2 wiki maintains a page with services and applications known 
to work well with Shibboleth [76].
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B.3.2.1.2. Joining InCommon
A NSF CI project may join InCommon itself or become a service provider under the auspices of an 
existing InCommon member. Please see Section C.4.2 for a discussion.
If the NSF CI project joins InCommon itself, the process is very similar as the process described 
for identity providers in Section B.1.3, namely selecting an Administrator and having them 
vetted, completing the Participant Operating Agreement, registering the site’s configuration with 
InCommon, and installing the InCommon metadata.
B.3.2.1.3. Arranging Attribute Release
Since InCommon does not dictate that identity providers release any set of attributes to other 
InCommon members or provide any metadata exposing attribute release policies of members, after 
registering their service provider in InCommon, the project needs to contact the identity providers 
of its users and arrange for attribute release as described in Section B.1.1.
This is unfortunately a time-consuming manual process, and subsequently making additions to this 
list of attributes will require re-contacting the identity providers. Hence it is strongly suggested that 
the project ensure they understand their requirements in this regard before undertaking this task.
A discussion of the attributes commonly required is found in Section C.4.3. Typically these 
attributes are used to map to a user’s entry in a local identity database as described subsequently in 
Section B.3.3.
Note that attribute release policies are written to release attributes to a specific service provider 
identifier, which means that changes to a service provider identifier are very painful, as they require 
contacting all identity providers to arrange the change of service provider identifier. 
B.3.2.1.4. Maintenance 
There are several components of the service provider deployment that require ongoing 
maintenance, which are very similar to the maintenance for an identity provider as described in 
section B.2.3:
•	 InCommon Metadata. InCommon will regularly have membership changes and contact 
information for existing members may also change from time to time. These changes will 
be reflected as changes in the metadata. Deployers can either configure a service provider 
[38,41] to use one of the metadata providers that download the metadata automatically (e.g., 
FileBackedHTTPMetadata-Provider) or regularly update the local metadata with, for example, 
cron.
•	 Local Metadata Information. Changes in the local deployment configuration may result in 
changes to the institutions metadata, which will need to be communicated to InCommon so 
that InCommon metadata remains up-to-date with regards to the local organization.
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•	 Software. As with any software, the Shibboleth SP software needs to be maintained with bug 
and security fixes. The appropriate announcement lists [83] should be monitored so that the 
organization is cognizant of fixes and new versions, and can arrange upgrades as appropriate.
•	 InCommon POP. If processes or policies for the local organization change, these will need to be 
reflected in the organization’s participant operational practices.
•	 Adding Supported Identity Providers. Each IdP may configure the attributes they release slightly 
differently and this needs to be configured in the SP attribute configuration so that those 
attributes are exposed to the application logic appropriately.
•	 Audit Log Rotation. As is typical with logs, rotation and retention policies should be defined 
and implemented. We recommend retaining logs for at least three months to accommodate 
security incidents that may not be immediately detected, though we acknowledge the exact 
amount of retention will depend on the size of available storage, the amount of SP usage, and 
any relevant policies.
•	 Reliability and Scalability. If replication of the service provider is needed for load-balancing or 
reliability, details for doing so may be found on the Internet2 web site [60].
B.3.2.1.5. Accessing Other Services (the n-Tier Problem)
A common workflow is for a user to interact with a project portal and for that portal to then act 
on behalf of the user to coordinate other resources.  For example, the portal may access data stored 
on another service for processing. This is often refereed to as the “n-tier” problem, with the portal 
representing the first tier of user interaction and then services coordinated by the portal as a second 
tier, and further services would represent the third tier and so forth.
Extensions to Shibboleth to support this use case [10] are still in the pipeline and not available for 
deployment. Currently the only option with this approach is to establish service-level trust between 
the project portal and 2nd tier services. The 2nd tier services will explicitly need to trust the project 
portal to be acting properly on behalf of a user and not require any proof that this is the case. The 
portal will typically authenticate using a credential issued to the portal specifically for this purpose. 
An example of this is the TeraGrid Science Gateway security model [75].
B.3.2.2. Using CILogon with a Project Web Portal
We now turn to the second solution, using CILogon to allow InCommon access through a 
project web portal. In this deployment scenario the project, rather than joining InCommon itself, 
establishes a relationship with the CILogon Service. Users are redirected to CILogon, which provides 
a PKI credential to the project portal as a result of InCommon authentication. This credential serves 
both to establish the user’s identifier for the portal and can be used by the portal to access other 
services on the user’s behalf (described subsequently in Section B.3.2.2.4). The text in this section 
provides a high-level overview of CILogon interaction, for details please see [7].
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B.3.2.2.1. Integrating Support for the CILogon Service into the Project Portal
The CILogon service uses the OAuth protocol [68] to coordinate the authentication of the user and 
delegation of the resulting user credential to the project portal. The portal will need to integrate 
CILogon client code in order to handle its side of this process. 
B.3.2.2.2. Establishing A Relationship with the CILogon Service
In addition to integration of client code, the CILogon service requires an exchange of cryptographic 
material with the project portal to allow for subsequent secured communication. A project portal 
administrator needs to contact the CILogon project to arrange this exchange of cryptographic 
information.
B.3.2.2.3. Effort and Maintenance
The level of effort to integrate with CILogon will vary depending on the portal implementation, but 
is roughly equivalent to integrating a new authentication mechanism.
Maintenance is required to keep client software and configuration for the relationship with CILogon 
up to date. As with any software and service, updates will be needed periodically to address bugs 
and security issues. The portal administrator should ensure they are on appropriate CILogon email 
lists in order to be cognizant of needed changes.
B.3.2.2.4. Accessing Other Services (the n-Tier Problem)
As described in Section B.3.2.1.5, some project portals may want to support workflows in which the 
portal acts on the user’s behalf to coordinate other services. In addition to the explicit trust model 
described in Section B.3.2.1.5, the PKI credential received from the CILogon Service allows the 
project portal to coordinate on the user’s behalf any service that accepts the user’s PKI credential.
B.3.2.3. Using CILogon with Command Line Clients
We now turn to the third solution, utilizing command-line clients with PKI credentials. In this 
deployment scenario, the project provides services that are accessed by command line applications 
or other clients that run on the user’s computer and authenticate via a PKI credential stored on their 
computer. In this scenario the delivery of the PKI credential to the user’s computer is done entirely 
by the CILogon Service, the project would direct the user to the CILogon Service to initiate this 
process. The project would need to provide a mechanism for the user to register the identifier in 
the PKI credential with the project so that they recognize the credential when it is presented. Since 
this is a one-time, or at least infrequent, event, a typical mechanism is to have the user authenticate 
via an existing mechanism and provide the PKI identifier (e.g., this is how TeraGrid does it [4]), or 
to have the user contact a member of the project staff and be manually vetted (e.g., this is how the 
Open Science Grid does it [71]).
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B.3.2.3.1. Effort and Maintenance
Establishing the ability to trust PKI credentials issued by the CILogon service is equivalent to 
establishing trust with any other PKI certificate issuer (i.e., certificate authority), which is typically 
not a difficult technical challenge. Developing the mechanism to allow users to bind their CILogon 
identity to their existing project identity requires developing a secured application capable of 
modifying a protected database, roughly a two-week task by a developer familiar with the services 
based on the authors’ experiences, plus appropriate time for testing and deployment.
B.3.3. Integration with Project Identity Management System
We turn now to issues common across all three solutions covered in the previous subsections. 
Federated identity allows the service provider to outsource authentication of the user to the identity 
provider, though typically the service provider will still need to maintain access control information 
about the user (e.g., what privileges the user has within the scope of the CI project).
Based on the experiences of the authors [4], it is suggested that the project maintain a project-
internal identifier for the user, to which they map the access control information as well as 
identifier(s) provided by the user’s identity provider(s). This is recommended for several reasons:
•	 Supporting multiple authentication methods. CI projects with previous or alternate 
authentication methods (e.g., OpenID, username and password, SSH keys) can map the 
identifiers of those methods to this internal identifier.
•	 Supporting user movement between institutions. Since the federated identity fabric does not 
support the portability of a user identity across organizations, if a user moves from one 
organization to another, their identifier will change. By allowing for a mapping, a CI project can 
remap the new identifier to the internal identifier and not require any other re-enrollment of 
the user. 
•	 Supporting joint appointments. Allowing multiple external identifiers to be mapped to the 
internal identifier addresses users who may present identities from different institutions at 
different times.
•	 Auditing. The project can track when the binding was made and, for institutions that potentially 
re-issue identifiers as discussed in Section B.2.1, re-affirm the binding on a regular basis.
•	 Staged Adoption. The project can migrate users from existing authentication systems to 
InCommon at whatever pace they desire.
The result of this approach is that it allows the process to establish a binding between the 
InCommon identifier (or its equivalent from the CILogon service) and the existing project identifier 
and subsequently map the user’s InCommon identifier to the project identifier. 
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B.3.3.1. Supporting Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
To continue the Jean Blue story from Section A.3.1:
“While at her collaboration platform, Jean notes that some content is now six 
months old and is now eligible for public access, though her funding agency 
requires to know the number of users of the data. She sets the access policies on 
this data to be world readable, but requiring either a federated identity or a social 
identity be used to access the data, allowing her to provide usage statistics.”
While federated identity and InCommon are important tools within the scope of authentication 
and authorization, they do not serve all the needs of either the institutions or the virtual 
organizations.  Many projects will have existing authentication mechanisms and users may already 
have accounts elsewhere – at social networking sites such as Google, MSN, Facebook, etc. – that a 
project may want to leverage.  (We include a discussion of social networking as an alternative in 
Section A.5).
One advantage of the approach where the project maintains an internal identifier for its users 
and maps external identities to that internal identifier is that multiple external identifiers from 
multiple mechanisms can be mapped to that internal identifier. This allows a project to support 
however many authentication mechanisms it sees fit. For example, this was used in the TeraGrid 
to add federated identity support to existing PKI, SSH RSA keys, one-time passwords, and standard 
passwords [4].
B.3.4. User Support and Security Incident Response
Federated identity brings some additional user support challenges since user access now involves 
services outside of those controlled by the project. It is recommended that projects do the following 
to aid in solving user support problems:
•	 Establish points of contact for support staff at services representing users, namely identity 
providers in InCommon or staff at the CILogon Service.
•	 Establish points of contact for security incident response at services representing users, namely 
identity providers in InCommon or staff at the CILogon Service.
•	 Establish a simple service that is robust as possible and tests basic user authentication and 
attribute release to determine if problems are related to federated identity. For example, for 
projects with a Shibboleth-enabled web portal this would validate receipt of the project’s 
required attributes. 
•	 For the service in the previous bullet, establish a procedure allowing support staff at services 
representing users the means to use it for testing. This helps establish a means for end-to-end 
testing that doesn’t require user involvement.
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B.3.5. Auditing and Logging
Auditing of federated identity is recommended for both user support and security incident 
response. With regards to user support, user access attempts could fail because they are utilizing 
unrecognized identity providers, identity providers that are not releasing required attributes, errors 
in configuration, network failures or software flaws. Ideally, access mechanisms will detect these 
failures and provide feedback to users as they happen, but audit logs should allow for debugging.
For security incident response, in the event a user interaction is suspected to be the work of an 
imposter, it is important that the project be able to identify what identity provider and user 
identifier were involved as well as other pertinent information (e.g., IP addresses of computers from 
which the client activity originated).
Additionally, projects may find aggregated usage information useful for reporting purposes.
B.3.6. Supporting Users Not at InCommon Institutions
To continue the story of Jean Blue:
“Jean then pursues one of her action items, to add several colleagues from around 
the world to the collaboration. She goes to her remote collaboration management 
platform, transparently authenticated using her earlier institutional login. Once 
there, she adds the email addresses of each of these new colleagues, to her group. 
She then clicks invite. Each of the collaborators instantly receives an invite email. 
By clicking on the URL within, they are prompted to authenticate to their own 
home institutions and then have their identity added to the collaboration group, 
instantly allowing access to the group wiki, adding them to the group email list, 
permitting them to schedule videoconferences, etc. Through federation, local 
authentication, wherever in the world, can be used to access global research 
resources.”
A problem that a project may run into is a user who is not located at an InCommon participating 
institution, either because that institution simply has not joined InCommon yet, or perhaps they 
are ineligible because they are outside the U.S.
In this circumstance, there are several solutions that can be explored:
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1. Research and Education federations for identity have been developing in many countries, 
particularly within those countries that have traditionally had extensive research 
relationships with the US, for example [74]. In some of these countries, coverage of the 
R&E community is now 100% and there is a robust federation infrastructure underlying 
almost all inter-institutional relationships. If the user’s institution acts as an identity 
provider as part of another compatible federation, for example, one of the European 
federations, the CI project could, assuming the Federation’s policies allow it, join that 
federation. Such membership in multiple federations, while not something the community 
has a lot of experience with, is possible at least in theory.
Alternatively, inter-federation between the federations could be explored. Activities are 
underway to “inter-federate”, that is to connect federations together at peering points to 
allow credentials to flow throughout the international research and education community. 
At this time, this would be a more experimental, time-consuming course.
2. If the user’s institution runs a compatible identity provider, the CI project can bilaterally 
peer with that institution [79,85]. The effort for doing this technically is roughly equivalent 
to joining a federation, though the parties would need to create their own mechanisms 
for maintaining up-to-date metadata between themselves. From a policy perspective, this 
process can be as formal or informal as the two parties desire.
3. The project can explore obtaining a guest account for the user at an InCommon participant. 
Typically this entails the project having a relationship with the participating institutions 
(e.g., the project PI is a faculty member).
4. Users can use a free identity provider that is an InCommon participant (e.g., 
ProtectNetwork [73]) to access InCommon-protected services. For projects using CILogon, 
it supports ProtectNetwork for just this reason. This approach is perhaps easiest for the CI 
project, but places the most burden on the users. It also means that, as with use of non-
SAML identities discussed in the next bullet, any attributes will be self-asserted by the user 
and have a lower level of trust than those asserted by a institution.
5. The project can support the use of identities used by Facebook, Google, Yahoo, etc. 
(typically through the OpenID or OAUTH protocols) and have the user authenticate 
through one of those services. For example, the CILogon service [8] supports both 
InCommon and OpenID. A full discussion of accomplishing this is beyond the scope of 
this document, however, following the advice in Section B.3.3 with regards to supporting 
multiple authentication methods should prove to be a large aid in accomplishing such 
support. Projects should keep in mind that these identities tend to be self-asserted and have 
lower levels of trust.
B.3.7. Provisioning
A decision to be made by the CI project is how new users will be enrolled in the project’s identity 
management system. The challenge is that the user’s identity, asserted by their identity provider, is 
not predictable by the project.
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The emerging best practice for enrollment in the context of federated identity is to design an 
InCommon-protected interface for the user to request enrollment. The interface requests from 
the user whatever attributes the CI project requires to complete enrollment (either via the 
federated identity mechanism or via manual web form completion). The CI project can then 
vet the enrollment request as they see fit. (This interface can be the same interface discussed in 
Section B.3.3 to map the user’s federated identity to an existing identity by requesting a second 
authentication of the existing identity.)
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The Guide to Policy and Business Processes is intended for managers and policy makers, 
and is a guide regarding the policy, privacy, financial and other concerns for InCommon 
deployment. Again it is both for staff from campuses (and other organizations which 
serve as a home to scientists and engineers) and NSF cyberinfrastructure projects.
Guide to Policy and Business 
Processes
C. Guide to Policy and Business Processes for 
Deployment
This section is meant to provide guidance with regards to policy and business process issues 
involved in the adoption of Shibboleth and joining InCommon. It is intended for policy decision 
makers in institutions and CI projects. This section starts with a brief introduction to the policy and 
business process issues, and follows with two subsections, one for institutions (identity providers) 
and one for CI projects (service providers).
For the most part, issues are not specific to supporting NSF CI, but have some details that are 
influenced by that support. Those details related to NSF CI are highlighted in the same manner as 
this paragraph.
C.1. Introduction to Policy and Business Process Issues
In this section we provide a brief introduction to policy and business process issues common to 
both institutions representing users and CI project providing services to those users. 
C.1.1. InCommon Participant Agreements and Operating Practices
InCommon members are expected to complete two documents. The first is the InCommon 
participant agreement [39], a legal document laying out the contractual relationship between the 
participant and InCommon. This agreement needs to undergo whatever process the institution 
has for signing contracts, which can be time consuming and thus should be initiated early in the 
process.
NSF CI projects typically are not legal entities in their own right and will need to have an 
organization represent the project in the process to sign the agreement. Typically this would be the 
lead institution for the project.
The second document is the Participant Operating Practices [39], which describes the technical, 
policy and business practices the organization or project has in place for identity management, 
attribute use, privacy, etc.  This document covers both existing identity management practices and 
practices related to federated identity. This document is completed in good faith and does not 
require a signature.
C.1.2. User Identifiers
For those used to traditional authentication systems centered around usernames, one slightly 
counterintuitive aspect of Shibboleth is that what one would typically think of as a user identifier is 
conveyed as an attribute. The reason is due to Shibboleth allowing for different types of identifiers 
to be conveyed in different situations to support privacy and anonymous access. Such identifiers 
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are often needed by NSF CI projects and will need to be considered by those projects when they 
determine their attribute requirements.
In order to support persistent identifiers needed by NSF CI, institutions need to understand their 
identity reuse policies. For example, if a faculty departs the institution, will they institution re-assign 
that identity to another incoming user? If so, after how long? 
C.1.3. Attribute Release and Consumption
A strength of Shibboleth is its ability to release attributes in a controlled manner. For each service 
provider, the Shibboleth identity provider administrator can configure what attributes will be 
released. Future technology, such as uApprove, discussed in Section F.1, would put the users in the 
loop and give them the opportunity to consent or deny the release.
Service providers consume attributes released to them to perform access control, personalization, 
etc. InCommon makes no requirement of its participants for what attributes they release to other 
InCommon participants. While an institution could choose to release attributes freely, most choose 
not to do so due to policy (e.g., FERPA) and privacy concerns, and instead establish a policy for 
deciding what attributes will be released to what services. In practice, this means that service 
provides must request the release of attributes they require from institutions representing their 
users.
C.1.4. Levels of Assurance
A “level of assurance” with respect to identity management is used convey the amount of trust 
one can have in an asserted identity. This is a complicated issue, covering, among other things, 
vetting practices of the institution making the assertion, the technical specifics of the authentication 
process, and institutional policies regarding password changing. For more detail, the reader is 
directed to NIST Special Publication 800-63 [62].
Strictly speaking, normal participation in InCommon by an identity provider guarantees nothing 
in terms of level of assurance; while an identity provider is expected to document their practices 
and policies in the Participant Operating Practices, there is no requirements on what those practices 
and polices are, or any requirements that they be audited. InCommon supports two levels of 
assurances that members may voluntarily achieve: Bronze and Silver [35], which are equivalent to 
levels 1 and 2 respectively in NIST Special Publication 800-63. Very simply put, Bronze entails basic 
authentication and identity management practices one could reasonably expect for a university 
with a mature identity management system to have in place, while Silver entails stronger vetting, 
authentication, and institutional audit that are more typical for sensitive applications (e.g., access to 
sensitive medical data).
At the time of this writing, InCommon Silver is still in the very early stages of adoption with only a 
small number of campuses in process of achieving it. Readers interested in exploring what achieving 
Silver entails, may be interested in the CIC report exploring Silver adoption [6].
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This document goes into no further detail on the matter except to say that CI projects providing 
access to sensitive data or resources may want to examine the Bronze and Silver profiles, 
and decide if requiring one or the other would benefit the project. Projects should be aware 
that, currently, the limited adoption of these profiles by InCommon participants will limit 
InCommon’s usefulness to the project. Experience in the TeraGrid project [4] has shown that 
identity vetting done by the project may augment lower levels of assurance to provide a higher 
effective level of assurance to the project.
C.2. Effort Required for Shibboleth Deployment and InCommon 
Membership
In Section A.4.4 we provided a table summarizing effort to join and maintain InCommon 
membership. We expand on that table here with more detail on each task.
C.2.1. Leadership
The entirety of the process of deploying federated identity and joining InCommon will require 
leadership from someone who is capable of orchestrating activities across technical, policy 
and business process units. On a campus, this typically requires someone at the level of the 
CIO’s office, or a delegate, to lead the deployment. Support of other campus leadership and 
administrative units (the Registrars or Human Resources offices are often important) is crucial. 
Coordination across the units to provide support and outreach to the campus researchers, 
students and other users will be important to achieve successful adoption and support.
For a CI project, it will require analogous leadership by the project’s technical lead with support 
from other project leadership.
C.2.2. Policy and Business Process Issues
From a policy and business process perspective, joining InCommon requires documenting 
existing identity management practices, and establishing policies for identity release or identity 
information use, for a CI project. This effort is equivalent to an effort to change a substantial 
authentication mechanism, for example, changing a policy on password strength. It requires 
mastery of current practices to understand who is impacted, bringing those parties together, 
reaching agreement on the change, and then implementing the new policies.
C.2.3. Signing the InCommon Participant Contract
Joining InCommon requires signing the Participant Agreement [39]. Signing the Participant 
Agreement will require engaging the organization’s or project’s usual process for contract signing.
C.2.4. Technical Effort to Deploy a Shibboleth Identity Provider
Deploying an identity provider system is roughly equivalent in terms of effort to deploying a web 
single sign-on technology (e.g., CAS [5]). It requires deploying a secured web service that acts as 
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the authentication service, and establishing new support, monitor, backup and fail-over processes 
for that service. As with any such service, it is typical for organizations to deploy it as a prototype 
first and then move to a production-level service over time. Hardware requirements are modest and 
load on the service is not a typical problem reported by organizations. It is, however, common for 
an organization to replicate a production identity provider service for reliability.
C.2.5. Technical Effort to Deploy a Shibboleth Service Provider
Federated identity by itself is just a foundation on which collaboration infrastructures can be built, 
and by itself is not useful to researchers; federated identity needs to be integrated into services 
such as web sites or applications to become useful. CI projects will need to deploy one or more 
service providers and campuses will probably also choose to do so in order to use federated identity 
internally.
Deploying a Shibboleth-protected service is roughly equivalent in effort to deploying any single 
sign-on protected web application, that is, the effort varies widely depending whether the hosting 
container is known to work with Shibboleth and whether the application has modular identity 
management that lends it to easy integration with federated identity. A more detailed discussion can 
be found in Section B.3.2.1.1 of the Technical Guide.
C.2.6. Effort Required to Add Federated Partners
Once an InCommon federated identity infrastructure is deployed, a common activity is adding 
a federated partner. Such partners can be identity providers representing users with whom the 
organization wishes to collaborate or provide services, or service providers representing CI or other 
services to which an organization wishes to provide their users access. Such additions may be 
initiated by the identity provider (e.g., by researchers or business needs) or by the service provider 
(e.g., a CI project wanting to establish a partnership for current or anticipated researchers).
From the technical point of view, InCommon and Shibboleth make the addition of such partners 
straightforward by defining the protocol format and privacy controls. This means such additions 
amount to configuration changes to configure attribute release and use for identity and service 
providers, respectively.
InCommon, however, does not define policies in regards to the release of attributes among its 
members, meaning those policies must be negotiated between interacting pairs of partners directly2. 
In practice this means the identity provider, taking into account their local privacy and policy 
considerations, deciding what user attributes they are comfortable exposing to a service provider, 
given that service provider’s needs and policies. An identity provider, by defining up front who 
is authorized to make this decision and what its requirements are in terms of what it allows and 
expects, can greatly streamline this process. Similarly, a service provider, by defining up front 
2 The goal of uApprove [93] is to change attribute release from an institutional policy to a decision 
by the user at time of their access to services. This process is expected to undergo significant changes when an 
identity provider adopts uApprove.
37
what identity information it requires and how it will use that information, can make the decision 
straightforward for identity providers.
C.2.7. Service Maintenance
The ongoing effort for maintaining InCommon and Shibboleth is comparable to maintaining any 
web single sign-on system, with requirements on maintaining software, configuration, certificates 
and fielding user support requests:
•	 Software maintenance. As with any software service, the software will periodically need to be 
upgraded due to security and compatibility issues. The appropriate announcement email lists 
should be monitored so that the organization is cognizant of new versions and can arrange 
upgrades as appropriate.
•	 Federation configuration maintenance. InCommon will regularly have membership changes and 
contact information for existing members may also change from time to time. This information 
is reflected in InCommon’s configuration data, commonly called “metadata”. The distribution 
of metadata is normally an automated process requiring no manual attention. Changes in the 
local configuration may result in changes to an institution’s metadata, which will need to be 
communicated to InCommon so that InCommon metadata remains up-to-date.
•	 InCommon Participant Operating Practices. If processes or policies for the local organization 
change, these will need to be reflected in the organization’s participant operational practices.
•	 Attribute Release Configuration. As discussed throughout this document, Shibboleth identity 
providers have configuration limiting what user attributes are released to what service providers. 
Unless a highly permissive policy is adopted, that configuration will need to be modified as 
service providers are added. This is discussed in Section C.3.4. For service providers, if their 
attribute requirements change, they will need to contact relevant identity providers to request 
configuration changes.
•	 Certificates. Identity and service providers require a SSL server certificate for their user-
facing web applications as with any other secured web server. Additionally, these services 
require a certificate for their Shibboleth endpoints, however these certificates can be (and are 
recommended to be) self-signed and renewed every three years [97].
•	 User support requests. As with any web single sign-on service there will be user support requests. 
Federation adds complexity in that issues may be caused by interactions among federated 
partners. In practice this means maintaining good contact information for support staff at 
partners to quickly resolve such issues. InCommon metadata has contact information for 
Shibboleth administration staff, which helps with locating other staff at an organization.
•	 Work force. As with any other service of this complexity, staff with up-to-date training is 
necessary to maintain it. Level of effort is analogous to staying abreast of other software systems 
and InCommon offers participants numerous online and in-person training opportunities 
as described in Section F.3.2. Internet2 Member Meetings [47] are also a good source of 
information.
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C.3. Institutional Deployment: Policy and Business Process Issues
In this section we discuss policy and business process issues for deploying Shibboleth and joining 
InCommon for an institution representing NSF scientists and engineers as an identity provider. 
The equivalent discussion for a CI project follows in Section C.4. These issues are for the most part 
generic to any identity provider joining InCommon and not specific to supporting NSF CI.
As with the Technical Deployment, and as discussed in Section A.4.1, a prerequisite to federated 
identity management is having an institutional identity management system in place. In the context 
of this section, this primarily means understanding the institution’s identity management policies 
and practices in order to complete the InCommon Participant Operating Procedures as discussed 
previously in Section C.1.1.
C.3.1. Policy Steps to Joining InCommon
Figure 2 gives a high-level, conceptual roadmap of the policy and business steps in joining 
InCommon. The figure shows a conceptual flow of activities and should not be taken as strict 
dependency graph; in fact, some of the later steps such as signing the Participant Agreement, 
should be initiated early in the process. We discuss each of the steps, and its associated issues and 
implications for supporting NSF CI in the following sections.
C.3.2. Project Planning
As with any complex project, the institution 
should undertake appropriate project 
planning. This document is not meant 
to replace a project plan. Some suggested 
reading and steps for this planning process 
includes:
•	 Determine InCommon eligibility. This 
is typically not an issue for universities. 
Details can be found in Section C.4.2.
•	 Identify institutional need and assess the 
value to the research and educational 
enterprise.  Identify some key projects 
that will demonstrate that value.
•	 Estimate level of effort as described in 
Sections A.4.2 and C.2.
•	 Explore alternatives to Shibboleth and 
InCommon (see Section A.5).
•	 Review the numerous resources InCommon has available for planning a federated identity 
deployment; a list as of the time of writing this document can be found in Section F.3.
Figure 2: High-level roadmap of policies 
issues for a campus (identity provider) 
joining InCommon.
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It is typical to plan on setting up a prototype Shibboleth deployment for testing and evaluation 
before executing a production deployment. If an organization takes this path, identifying one ore 
more NSF CI projects of interest to the institution’s researchers and the researchers using those 
projects to test the prototype is recommended.
C.3.3. Understanding Current Identity Management Polices and 
Processes
The institution needs to understand its current identity management policies and procedures. The 
primary reasons for this are to plan the technical integration between Shibboleth and the identity 
management system as discussed in Section B.2.2 of the Technical Guide, and to complete the 
InCommon Participant Operations Practices [39], discussed in Section C.1.1.  Those with the 
better-defined identity management policies and practices, including risk management strategies for 
unintended identity information leakage (see Section C.3.7), will more easily provision a federated 
identity system through InCommon.  
As discussed in Section C.1.2, NSF CI often has a requirement for identifiers for researchers, which 
are, ideally, not re-assigned to other users, e.g., when a researcher departs the organization. During 
this study of the existing identity management system, forming a solid understanding of when and 
under what circumstances a user identifier can be reassigned will be helpful to supporting NSF CI.
C.3.4. Attributed Release Policies 
Shibboleth provides configuration to control what user attributes are released to what service 
providers, including NSF CI projects. Institutions should anticipate requests for attribute release 
by service provides and have a policy in place for how they should response to help expedite these 
interactions. 
One can roughly categorize these requests for attribute release into two cases: requests for 
identifying attributes or requests for aggregate attributes. The latter consist of attributes such as the 
user’s role at the institution (e.g., Faculty) while the former consistent of persistent identifiers or 
other personally identifying information such as name or email address. Typically NSF CI projects 
will make requests for identifying attributes. These requests tend to be the more challenging from a 
policy perspective, so we focus on those requests here.
In the experience of the Roadmap authors, the following procedures are commonly used to respond 
to these attribute release requests:
1. Highly permissive approach. Attributes are released to other InCommon members freely or 
with light scrutiny by operations staff.
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2. Justification required approach. In this case, a justification for attribute release needs to be 
presented by the requestor, potentially including a list of users at the institution in question 
and intended use of the released identification and attributes. An identified individual or 
individuals inside the organization evaluate the justification.
3. Champion required approach. A person at the institution needs to step forward to champion 
the service provider’s attribute release request. This is typically coupled with a justification 
as discussed in the previous bullet (2).
This Roadmap strongly advocates against the champion-based approach because users of NSF CI 
projects tend to be domain scientists, and putting them front and center in discussions regarding 
federated identity tends to work poorly as they usually are not identity management experts. It 
is advisable to consult researchers identified in a project’s justification to vouch for their use of 
that project’s CI and elaborate on their science needs to ensure those are being served. Our advice 
therefore is procedure (2), including consulting some set of the researchers involved.
C.3.5. User support Procedures
As with any similar service, user support personnel will need to be trained in the new service. 
Additionally, because of federated identity’s nature of being distributed among multiple 
organizations, it is suggested than user support personnel establish relationships with their 
counterpart at service providers of significant interest, or at least know those counterparts’ contact 
information readily.
One challenge that NSF CI often brings as compared to standard InCommon service providers 
is that institutional support personnel often do not have access themselves to the NSF CI, since 
that access tends to be granted on a user-by-user basis rather than to subsets of the university 
population. This strengthens the previous suggestion to establish a relationship with the NSF 
CI project support staff and also explore if access can be arranged for troubleshooting (e.g., the 
TeraGrid offers a ‘Campus Champions’ program [91] which would provide this).
C.3.6. Joining InCommon: Agreement and Documentation
The process of joining InCommon includes signing the Participant Agreement and completing 
the Participant Operating Practices as described in Section C.1.1. It also includes establishing an 
InCommon Executive. The Executive will be identified to InCommon as the ultimate authority with 
regards to the institution’s membership. In practice, the Executive assigns an administrative point 
of contact that will handle day-to-day technical activities. It is recommended that the Executive be a 
CIO, VP of IT, or similar position in the institution.
C.3.7. Risk Management for Accidental Attribute Release
Despite technical and policy controls, it is possible due to misconfiguration or software flaw for 
user attributes to be disseminated beyond what is intended. Organizations should consider in their 
risk profile and/or author policy for such a situation. Questions to consider include: How will the 
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organization handle a misconfiguration event that leads to attributes being released by accident? 
How will accidental release by a partnered service provider be handled?
C.4. Cyberinfrastructure Deployment: Policy and Other Issues
This section focuses on CI Projects who are joining InCommon.
C.4.1. Policy Steps to Joining InCommon
The major policy steps in joining InCommon for CI project are:
1. Establish Membership Eligibility [1] as discussed subsequently in Section C.4.2.
1. Sign the Participant Agreement [39] as discussed in C.1.1.
1. Establish the InCommon Executive. The Executive will be identified to InCommon as the 
ultimate authority with regards to the institution’s membership. In practice, the Executive 
assigns an administrative point of contact that will handle day-to-day technical activities. It 
is recommended that the Executive be a technical lead for the project.
1. Complete and submit the InCommon Participant Operating Practices [39]. This process will 
often include collecting practices from different units of the institution.
1. Determine Required Attributes. Discussed subsequently in C.4.3.
1. Identify Institutions of Interest and Arrange Attribute Release. The project needs to identify 
what institutions represent their users and then contact those institutions to arrange 
attribute release. How the institutions are identified is project specific; for an existing 
project it can be accomplished by surveying existing users, while new projects may need to 
make educated guesses. Arranging attribute release is discussed in the Technical Guide in 
Section B.3.2.1.3.
C.4.2. InCommon Membership Eligibility
InCommon has requirements for membership [1] that entail members being a U.S. Institution 
of Higher Education or sponsored by InCommon member. The sponsorship process [40] is not 
financial and entails having an existing InCommon member request membership on behalf of the 
project.
The simplest route for an NSF CI project is not to join InCommon as a separate entity, but instead 
have a relationship with an InCommon member institution (e.g., the project PI’s or co-PI’s home 
institution) such that it can be registered as a service provider under that institution’s membership. 
Since InCommon membership allows for the registration of 50 service providers per identity 
provider [31], most institutions are likely to have such registrations to spare. In this case the project 
will need to work with the institution’s InCommon administrator to update the institution’s 
Participant Operating Practices and metadata.
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C.4.3. Determining Federated Identity Attribute Needs
Shibboleth was originally established so service providers could ascertain institutional affiliation 
of users without sharing any personally identifying information. This privacy-preserving mode of 
operation works well for services such as online journal subscriptions. 
However, service providers providing access to sensitive data or other resources typically require 
identification of individual users (i.e., authentication). Many NSF CI projects fall into this category.  
When using Shibboleth, user identifiers of this sort are conveyed to a service provider as attributes, 
hence although one would normally call this authentication, in the context of Shibboleth, it falls 
into the attribute release process.
Other attributes tend to fall into either contact information for the user (e.g., email, phone number) 
or other information about the user that is useful to the project for aggregate reporting to funding 
agencies (e.g., field of study, professional title, ethnicity, gender). Projects have the choice of 
collecting this information themselves when enrolling the user (e.g., via a web form) or requesting 
these attributes via federated identity.
The advantage of collecting the information directly from the user is simplicity. The user’s 
institution need not be involved in the policy decision and privacy concerns are simplified since it 
is clear the user is meaning to provide the attributes when they fill out the forms. The disadvantages 
of this approach is the user is trusted to accurately assert the information and collecting the 
information requires manual action by the user, meaning it causes inconvenience to do so 
frequently.
The advantages of receiving the attributes regularly via federated identity are that they are more 
likely to be kept up to date by the user’s home institution (this is mainly a factor for contact 
information such as telephone numbers), they are typically vetted by the institution, providing 
greater assurance of accuracy, and they are provided automatically by Shibboleth for each user 
session without requiring action by the user.
In either case, the project should establish privacy policies and practices around collected attributes 
and be prepared to share those policies with institutions from whom they are requesting attribute 
release. (Ideally, they would publish those policies for their user communities as well.)
C.4.4. Level of Assurance
In Section A.4.2 we provided a brief introduction to the risks of federated identity; one of these 
risks is the risk that an identity provider, through some accident, misrepresents a user’s identity. To 
help gauge this risk, InCommon has multiple levels of assurance that identity providers can operate 
under (e.g., Silver) [35]. An identity provider, by operating at a higher level of assurance, gives 
relying service providers greater assurance that identities are indeed consistent and reliable.
This document only covers the most basic of these levels and the more stringent levels are out of 
scope. One reason a project may need higher levels of assurance is if regulatory measures require it. 
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The higher levels of assurance are meant to be consistent with the U.S. federal government’s levels 
of assurance as defined in NIST Special Publication 800-63 [62]. NSF CI projects falling under 
the definition of Large Facilities should be aware of this decision to fulfill their requirements for a 
security plan on the terms of the cooperative agreement [64].
C.4.5. Sociological Impact of Outsourcing Authentication
A common challenge for existing projects adopting federated identity is that staff may resist the 
distribution of the identity management process across the InCommon federation. While there is 
no silver bullet to solving this problem, identifying key staff, providing them access to training and 
having them involving in the process as early as possible can mitigate this problem.
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D. Glossary of Terms
For the reader’s convenience, we provide here a set of terms relevant to federated identity used 
throughout this document. We thank the InCommon organization as many of these definitions are 
taken from the InCommon glossary [33] and reproduced with the permission of InCommon.
•	 Administrator - In the context of InCommon, the Administrator serves as the participating 
organization’s primary registrar. The Administrator is responsible for registering and 
maintaining the policies and technical data related to the organization’s participation in the 
InCommon Federation, including the submission of the URL of the Participant’s POP and any 
Identity Provider and/or Service Provider metadata and associated certificates. The participating 
organization’s designated Executive assigns the Administrator.
•	 Assertion - The identity information provided by an Identity Provider to a Service Provider.
•	 Attribute - A single piece of information associated with an electronic identity database record. 
Some attributes are general; others are personal. Some subset of all attributes defines a unique 
individual. Examples of an attribute are name, phone number, and group affiliation.
•	 Attribute Assertion - A mechanism for associating specific attributes with a user. 
•	 Attribute Authority (AA) - The Shibboleth software service that asserts the requesting 
individual’s attributes by creating an attribute assertion and then digitally signing it. The 
receiving online Service Provider must be able to validate this signature.
•	 Attribute Release Policy (ARP) - Rules that an AA follows when deciding whether or not to 
release an attribute and its value(s)
•	 Audit - An independent review and examination of a system’s records and activities to 
determine the adequacy of system controls, ensure compliance with established security policy 
and procedures, detect breaches in security services, and recommend any changes that are 
indicated for countermeasures.
•	 Authentication (AuthN) - The security measure by which a person transmits and validates his 
or her association with an electronic identifier. An example of authentication is submitting a 
password that is associated with a user account name. 
•	 Authorization (AuthZ) - The process for determining a specific person’s eligibility to gain 
access to a resource or service, a right or permission granted to access an online system.
•	 Boarding Process – the term used to describe the process a service provider goes through on 
joining a federation to arrange receiving the attributes it requires from the identity providers.
•	 Billing Contact - In the context of InCommon, the Billing Contact is responsible for executing 
and maintaining all of the Participant’s financial transactions associated with its InCommon 
federation participation, including any necessary communication with its internal Executive 
and Administrative Contacts, and externally with federation accounting staff.
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•	 Directory - A directory is a specialized database that may contain information about an 
institution’s membership, groups, roles, devices, systems, services, locations, and other 
resources.
•	 eduPerson - An LDAP object class authored and promoted by the EDUCAUSE/Internet2 
eduPerson Task Force to facilitate the development of inter-institutional applications. The 
eduPerson object class focuses on the attributes of individuals. Current documentation on the 
eduPerson object class is available at http://www.educause.edu/eduperson/.
•	 Electronic identifier - A string of characters or structured data that may be used to reference an 
electronic identity. Examples include an email address, a user account name, a campus NetID, 
an employee or student ID, or a PKI certificate.
•	 Electronic identity - A set of information that is maintained about an individual, typically 
in campus electronic identity databases. May include roles and privileges as well as personal 
information. The information must be authoritative to the applications for which it will be 
used.
•	 Enterprise directory - An enterprise directory is a core middleware architecture that may 
provide common authentication, authorization, and attribute services to electronic services 
offered by an institution.
•	 Executive – In the context of InCommon, the Executive represents the participant organization 
regarding all decisions and delegations of authority for the responsibilities of InCommon 
Participants, including but not limited to payment of invoices, and assigning any person in the 
trusted Administrator role who submits Certificate Signing Requests, metadata, or Certificate 
Revocation Requests, and other administrative duties as described herein. The Executive is 
authorized as such in the InCommon participation agreement or by succession from the 
originally named Executive. The Executive role will typically be filled by a CIO, VP of IT, or 
other senior administrative officer responsible for the organization’s information technology 
assets.
•	 Federated identity - The management of identity information between members of a 
federation.
•	 Federation - A federation is an association of organizations that come together to exchange 
information as appropriate about their users and resources in order to enable collaborations 
and transactions.
•	 Identity - Identity is the set of information associated with a specific physical person or other 
entity. Usually not all identity attributes are relevant in any given situation. Typically an Identity 
Provider will be authoritative for only a subset of a person’s identity information.
•	 Identity credential - An electronic identifier and corresponding personal secret associated with 
an electronic identity. An identity credential typically is issued to the person who is the subject 
of the information to enable that person to gain access to applications or other resources that 
need to control such access.
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•	 Identity database - A structured collection of information pertaining to a given individual. 
Sometimes referred to as an “enterprise directory.” Typically includes name, address, email 
address, affiliation, and electronic identifier(s). Many technologies can be used to create an 
identity database or set of linked relational databases.
•	 Identity Management System - A set of standards, procedures and technologies that provide 
electronic credentials to individuals and maintain authoritative information about the holders 
of those credentials. 
•	 Identity Provider (IdP) - The originating location for a user. Previously called the Origin Site 
in the Shibboleth software implementation. For InCommon, an IdP is a campus or other 
organization that manages and operates an identity management system and offers information 
about members of its community to other InCommon participants. 
•	 InCommon federation - InCommon is a formal federation of organizations focused on 
creating a common framework for trust in support of research and education. The primary 
purpose of the InCommon federation is to facilitate collaboration through the sharing of 
protected network-accessible resources by means of an agreed-upon common trust fabric. 
InCommon participation is separate from membership in Internet2.
•	 InCommon Technical Advisory Committee - Group of individuals that provide technical 
guidance and direction for InCommon.
•	 Level of Assurance (LoA) - A level of assurance with respect to identity management is used 
convey the amount of trust one can have in an asserted identity. This is a complicated issue, 
covering, among other things, vetting practices of the institution making the assertion, the 
technical specifics of the authentication process, and institutional policies regarding password 
changing. For more detail, the reader is directed to NIST Special Publication 800-63 [62].
•	 Metadata - Data about data, or information known about an object in order to provide access 
to the object. Usually includes information about intellectual content, digital representation 
data, and security or rights management information.
•	 Participant - An organization accepted into the InCommon Federation that has met all the 
criteria for participation as either a higher education institution or a Sponsored Partner. 
•	 Participant Agreement (PA) - This is the “contract” that a potential Participant signs when 
they are accepted by the Federation. This document outlines information such as fees, and 
responsibilities to participate in InCommon. 
•	 Participant Operating Practices (POP) - This document describes how InCommon Participants 
need to describe their credential and identity management system.
•	 Persistent Identifier – A user identifier than is reused across multiple sessions. Such an 
identifier allows a service to maintain state about a user, for example, their ownership of data or 
personalization preferences.
•	 Privacy Policy - A statement to users of what information is collected and what will be done 
with the information after it has been collected.
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•	 Pseudonymous authentication - Authentication with an identifier that remains consistent 
across sessions, but doesn’t expose any personal information in itself, for example, a 
pseudonym one might create on an Internet forum.
•	 Service Provider (SP) - Previously called the Target Site in the Shibboleth software 
implementation. For InCommon, an SP is a campus or other organization that makes online 
resources available to users based in part on information about them that it receives from other 
InCommon participants.
•	 Shibboleth® - Software developed by Internet2 to enable the sharing of web resources that are 
subject to access controls such as user IDs and passwords. Shibboleth leverages institutional 
sign-on and directory systems to work among organizations by locally authenticating users 
and then passing information about them to the resource site to enable that site to make 
an informed authorization decision. The Shibboleth architecture protects privacy by letting 
institutions and individuals set policies that control what information about a user can 
be released to each destination. For more information on Shibboleth please visit: http://
shibboleth.internet2.edu/uses.html.
•	 Sponsored Partner - A business partner that provides resources to a higher education 
institution, and is sponsored for participation in InCommon by a participating higher 
education institution.
•	 Technical Contact - The Technical Contact for InCommon serves as the primary point of 
contact for all technical issues for the organization participating in InCommon. The technical 
contact communicates with federation technical staff to ensure smooth operation of the 
federation’s infrastructure.
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F. Additional Resources
F.1. Future Resources
In this section we briefly discuss technologies and other services that are not available today, but 
are expected to be available in the next future and which may bring benefit to NSF CI projects and 
institutions that house NSF researchers. These technologies are listed in no particular order.
F.1.1. UApprove
uApprove [93] is a software extension to a Shibboleth IdP which allows the user to make attribute 
release decisions instead of relying on the Shibboleth IdP administrator and organization policy. 
Many organizations are hoping that by putting the decision into the hands of the users, it will ease 
concerns around FERPA [16].
F.1.2. Federated SSH Work
A current limitation of InCommon and Shibboleth is a lack of support for applications other than 
web browsers. As we discussed in the Guide to Technical Deployment, CILogon exists to bridge 
from InCommon to PKI credentials, used by many command line grid applications.
Two future developments that are working to address adding federating identity support to a 
broader range of non-web application are Project MoonShot [72] and the Federated SSH work as 
part of the COmanage project [9].
F.1.3. FedApps Working Group
Internet2 is starting a working group to investigate issues involved with making applications 
available via federated identity. This working group, entitled “FedApps” [48], is in the process of 
forming at the time of this writing.
F.2. Identity Management Resources
Establishing an identity management system is outside the scope of this document, some resources 
for doing are:
•	 The NMI-Edit web site: http://www.nmi-edit.org/started/index.cfm
•	 InCommon IAM Online: http://www.incommon.org/iamonline/
•	 Educause Federated Identity Management Resources: http://www.educause.edu/Resources/
Browse/FederatedIdentityManagement/31075/
•	 Jansson, Eric. NITLE Shibboleth and Federated Identity Management Roadmap for Smaller 
Colleges and Universities. Connexions. August 20, 2009. http://cnx.org/content/m31491/latest/
•	 JISC. The Identity Management Toolkit. https://gabriel.lse.ac.uk/twiki/bin/view/Projects/
IdMToolkit/Toolkit/
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F.3. Resources for Federated Identity Deployment
F.3.1. Examples of Deployments
In this section we list some examples of deployments to provide the reader with some real-world 
experience from institutions that may approximate their own:
•	 EDUCAUSE presentation describing experiences at UCLA, Penn State and New Castle (UK): 
http://www.educause.edu/Resources/ShibbolethCaseStudies/161773/
•	 Deploying Shibboleth: Technical Requirements, Policy Issues, and Case Studies 
(presentations from USC, Penn State, MIT): http://www.educause.edu/Resources/
DeployingShibbolethTechnicalRe/169205/
•	 Shibboleth In Use, a collection of use cases on the Shibboleth web site: http://shibboleth.
internet2.edu/shib-in-use.html
•	 InCommon Case Studies: http://www.incommonfederation.org/cases.html
•	 USC Case Study by NMI-EDIT: http://www.nmi-edit.org/case_studies/usc-shibpubc.pdf
•	 Implementing a production Shibboleth IdP service at Cardiff University (presentation slides): 
http://www.slideshare.net/JISC.AM/cardiff-jisc-fam-aston-may07/
•	 InCommon … Now That’s the Ticket. Lafayette provides students with SSO ticketing 
convenience. http://www.incommonfederation.org/docs/eg/InC_CaseStudy_UTix_
Lafayette_2009.pdf
F.3.2. InCommon Training Opportunities
The best place to look for an up to date list of training opportunities is the InCommon Education 
and Training web site [30], which includes both a list of in-person workshops and online seminars.
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The cover image is based on Joachim Bering’s etching of the city of Königsberg, Prussia as of 
1613 (now Kaliningrad, Russia). Seven bridges connect two islands in the Pregal River and the 
portions of the city on the bank. The mathematical problem of the Seven Bridges of Königsberg 
is to find a path through the city that crosses each bridge once and only once. Euler proved in 
1736 that no solution to this problem exists or could exist. This image appears on the cover of 
each of the Campus Bridging Workshop reports. 
Campus bridging is the integrated use of cyberinfrastructure operated by a scientist or 
engineer, other cyberinfrastructure on the scientist’s campus, at other campuses, the regional, 
national, and international levels in a seamless manner as if they were proximate to the 
scientist and when working within the context of a Virtual Organization make the ‘virtual’ 
aspect of the organization irrelevant (or helpful) to the work of the VO. The challenges of 
effective bridging of campus cyberinfrastructure are real and challenging – but not insolvable 
if the US open science and engineering research community works together with focus on the 
greater good of the US and the global community. Other materials related to campus bridging 
may be found at: https://pti.iu.edu/campusbridging/
